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missal of students fo r academic
reasons has been adopted and
will be effective for the current
school year.
.
·d f
Th e po 1icy prov1 es or a special test to be administered to
students who have been dismissed for poor scholarship.
A student must still retain an
average of at least 71.00 during
each academic year. Any student whose average falls below
71.00 in any academic year will
be dismissed from law school.

However, now a student
whose average falls within the
range of 69.00 to 70.99 inclusive may take the special test,
which will be given in late
A
t
h
ugus eac year.
The following rules govern
the administration of the test :
The examination will be a
comprehensive test containing
one question from each subject
that the examinee has taken during the preceding year. One
hour will be allowed for each
question.

A fee of $30 will be charged
to each student who applies to
take the special test.
An examinee who scores at
least 73 .00 on the test will be
allowed to continue as though
he had passed originally. If he
fails to attain a grade of at least
73 he will not be allowed to
return.
If a student is readmitted his
original grades will stand and
be used for purposes of computing his cumulative average

and class rank when he graduates.
A student must take the spe·
cial test in the summer immediately following the year in which
he has been dismissed.

No student will be allowed
to retest more than once. He
will not be allowed to take a
second special test after failing
any special test. Nor will he be
allowed to take a second special
test if he has once successfully
been readmitted on the basis of
a special test.

This special examination will
constitute the only specific form
of relief for a student who has
been dismissed for low scholarship. This system was arrived at
after a careful consideration of
various other alternatives, the
Administration said.
It is felt that this system will
provide a second chance for a
student to demonstrate that his
original grades did not truly refleet his ability.
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Dean, SBA
Hold School
Policy Meet
Dean Douglas Heidenreich met
with Student Bar representatives
and students in April to discuss
school policies and respond to specific suggestions and complaints.
'Tm very much in favor of this
kind of meeting," Heidenreich
said, "and I hope we can do it
again next year."
The dean invited students to
bring their ideas to him and also to
comment to him on the faculty's
performance. On the latter point
he said:
"I might be hard on you, but
don't let that bother you."

Heidenreich made these responses to the following questions
and suggestions :
FOURTH YEAR WORK
LOAD. Students have complained
that the first semester of the fourth
year involves a relatively light work
load while the schedule is quite
heavy during the second semester
when graduates need to prepare for
the July bar examinations.
"You don't try to build your
curriculum around preparation for
a bar exam," the dean said. "The
student should try to find the time
to prepare for it."
Special attention was devoted to
the Moot Court course in which
students argue one case during the
first semester and during the second
semester argue a second case and
prepare one special term pleading
and one appellate brief.
"We devote more time to Moot
Court than any other law school
that I know of," Heidenreich said.
"Some schools don't require it."
The present Moot Court course
is being reevaluated, he said.
"We could make it a one semester course, an elective, or make it
an extra curricular activity by stripping out the non-essentials," he
said.

Heidenreich also said the special
term pleading or the aQPellate brief
could be m oved ap to the first
semester.
COURSE PACE. Students complained that some professors conqentrate excessively on portions of
(Continued On Page 2)
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65 to Graduate June 10

Judge Luther Youngdahl to Speak at Commencement
The speaker at the Mitchell
commencement this year will be
Judge Luther Youngdahl, senior
federal district judge for the District of Columbia, and a former
governor of the State of Minnesota.
The graduation exercises will
be held at 8:00 P.M. Monday,
June 10, in the Armory of the
College of St. Thomas.
Sixty five graduates will receive
J.D. or LLB. degrees.

city attorney in Minneapolis and
practiced law there until 1930
when he was appointed to the
Minneapolis Municipal bench.

Judge Youngdahl will be honored at a special luncheon Monday,
June 10, at the Minnesota Club in
St. Paul. The Board of Trustees,
members of the Minnesota State
Supreme Court, federal judges and
other friends of the school will
attend.

The graduates, their spouses, and
parents will attend the annual graduation party at the school on the
evening of Friday, June 7, 1968.
Honor graduates will be named
then, awards will be granted and
certificates of appreciation will be
presented to persons designated by
the graduates.

Judge Youngdahl was awarded
the A .B. degree from Gustavus
Adolphus College and in 1921 received his LLB degree from the
Minnesota College of Law, a predecessor institution of William
Mitchell. He served as assistant

Court from 1942 to 1947. In 1947
he was elected governor and
served until 1951 when he wa·s
appointed to the United States
District Court for the District of
Columbia.

Youngdahl

He served on the Hennepin
County District bench from 1936
to 1942 and was an associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme

The graduates, assuming satisfactory completion of their school
work:
Lawrence E. Agerter, M arion E.
Atkins, James V. Beal, Claude M.
Biros, Frank W . Bonvino, John K.
Bouquet, P aul W. Buegler, Harry
J . Coult, Thomas E . Cronin, Daniel L Ficker, Craig W. Gagnon,
Clifford W. Gardner, Michael J.
Garvey, William S. Glew, Edward
J . Hance, Jerrold M. Hartke, William J . Hay, William J. Hennessy,
John R. Hoffman.

James W . Hoolihan, James J.
Hulwi, Victor J. Johnson, Larry G.
Jorgenson, Dorothy A. Juenemann,
Thomas P. Kane, Stephen C. Lapadat, Gerald M. Linnihan, Rita E.
Lukes, Clifford C. Lundberg, Ronnie E. Mccready, Charles J. McKusick, Hugh P. Markley, Vernon F. Minnis, John S. Monroe
Jr., James R. Morris, Darrell K.
Morse.
Francis E. Muelken, William H.
Muske, Thomas M. Neitge, Bruce
A. Nemer, Nancy K. Olkon, Glen
L Olsen, Hugh V. Plunkett 111,
Gary L. Pringle, John D. Quinlivan, Gerald A. Regnier, James M.
Riley, Ronald C. Ruud, Allan P.
Salita, William M. Schade, Neil B.
Schulte, Neil I. Sell, Gregory V.
Smith.
Brian L. Solem, William D.
Sommerness, Thomas W. Spence,
Rodger D. S. Squires, Eugene M.
Stapleton, Louis E. Torinus, James
J. Tuzinski, Marinus W. Van Putten, Terrance W. Vote!, Roger C.
Wachter, Robert E. Walrath, and
William W. Warren.

Because of Militar Draft

1968-1969 Mitchell Enrollment May Decline 15 Per Cent
The loss of military draft deferments by ome Mitchell students
and prospective tuden ts may trim
the enrollment aex:t year by 50
to 60 students, or 15 per cent,
Dean Heidenreich said.
Ap plications for admission are
running behind recent years - 144
as of Mid-May, eomparec.,t with 192
at the same time in 1967 and 160
in 1966.
Registrar Jack Davies said, however, it is possible that applications
will jump sharply late this summer
if the draft call runs lower than
expected.

"Assuming that every first year
student for whom a 103 form was
sent to the draft board this year is
drafted next year we would lose
ap proximatel y 25 to 30 students
fro m next year's second year class,"
Heidenreich said. "Assuming also
that the composition of the applicants for next year's entering class
is approximately the same as the
group that applied this year, ap-

proximately 25 to 30 students who
would be eligible to enter school
may, because of the removing of
the student deferment, either not
enroll in law school or may be
drafted out of their first year."
"This means that the total decrease in the size of our student
body next year is likely to be
somewhere between 50 and 60 students, or approximately 15 per

cent. While this is not as great as
the decline which is expected in the
day law schools around the country, many of whom are predicting
a 25 to 50 per cent or eveo higher
decline, it will still have a noticeable effect," Dean Heidenreich said.

the service will definitely be allowed to return when they complete their service obligation,"
Heidenreich said.

"While no specific rules have
been established by the faculty, students who are compelled to leave
school because of being called into

Lauck Leaving
For Miami Post

Costs Rise, Tuiton, Too
The tuition at William Mitchell College of Law will be increased from
$600 a year to $700 beginning with the 1968-69 school year, Dean Douglas
Heidenrich announced.
The new tuition is about the average of night law schools in the couutry,
he said. The 1967-68 national range was from about $150 to nearly $1,400
per year, lhe dean said. Almost \ ithout exceptio.o schools charging less than
$600 annually in 1967-68 ceceived government SIJ(>pOrl, be aid.
The increase reflects the general increase in costs of goods and services
and rising salaries, he said. The hike means that Mitchell, as with most
law schools in the country, has increased its tuition 100 per cent .in the
last 10 years.

Professor Robert G . Lauck will
join the School of Law at the University of Miami next fall, it was
announced this week.
Lauck will become director of
admissions and counseling and assume an academic appointment a~
well.
Lauck joined the Mitchell fac.
ulty in 1964 and has taught Commercial Transactions, Administra.
tive Law and Government Con·
tracts Law.
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Dicta From the Dean

Editorials

Mitchell's Moot Court Unique

SBA ELECTIONS
The retiring Student Bar Association officers and Board of Governors
are to be commended.
They displayed leadership, imagination and initiative during the
1967-68 school year. Chief among their achievements are the establishment of a Faculty-Student Liaison Committee and joint sponsorship with
Phi Alpha Delta of a Career Night forum.
It is hoped that the newly elected officers and board will carry on with
the same leadership, imagination and initiative. Certainly they should
pursue the goals of the Liaison Committee with vigor and responsibility.
As for internal matters, however, it is suggested that the SBA reevaluate the manner in which officers are elected.
SBA by-laws were amended in the spring of 1967 to authorize the
election of officers by the Board of Governors instead of the student
body. The practice is questionable.
The case for the system is basically two-fold :
1. The 16 members on the Board of Governors know the candidates'
qualifications better than do the individual students. The majority electing
the officers presumably would be inclined to work with them in harmony.
2 . Election by the student body at large gives unequal weight to the
large first-year class whose students don't know SBA problems as well
as students from the smaller advanced classes.
We recommend a new hard look at this procedure. Democracy would
seem to require elections at large.
Or perhaps as a compromise the students could vote on the candidates
and bind their class representatives on the board to vote for the candidates
the class favors.
In any event the election process should be reexamined.

Justice for All
The school day always started the same way. "Good morning, Miss
Wilson." "Good morning, class, stand and salute the flag. I pledge
allegiance to the flag . . . one nation . . . with liberty and justice for
all be seated." It took some of us quite a while to learn that "be seated"
was not part of the pledge of allegiance.
For most of us, the words tumbled out by rote and meant about as
much as the Fa la la la la in "Deck the halls with boughs of holly."
It might have impressed us more if the teacher just once had said
"liberty and justice for murderers, thieves, traitors, extortioners and
drunken bums."
That's the lesson that needs to be taught. "All" means everybody, the
worst and the best, and the worth of a society is to be judged by the
way its best treat its worst.
The school children of yesterday have turned into the world citizens
of today, most of them. Some became reprobates. The latter are just as
much entitled to the Bill of Rights as the solid citizens - and ever so
much more in need of it. The popular sentiment seems to be that only
nice people ought to be protected by the constitutional guarantees. The
line of Supreme Court decisions re-affirming the right of all individuals
to be defended against the imprisoning power of the state has drawn great
outcry from nice people who know they'll never need to take the Fifth,
and are confident that an illegal search of their homes would not turn
up drugs, or guns or dirty pictures.
Ibey have a poin t. The innocent sbould be protected and the guilty
-should be punished. The question is: h ow should the tate proceed to
determine who is guilty? There are ome fin e people in jail in Greece, in
prison in Cuba, dead in Haiti, or vanished forever behind the Iron
Curtain. They were nice folks, until the State said they weren't.
There is no innocence in this world unless the individual has the right
to assert his innocence and compel the state to prove otherwise to his
fellow men. That is what the Supreme Court is saying, and that is the
principle which lawyers should be defending.
1l is a orry sight to see a pro ecuting attorney, who is a )av er and
ough t to k:no\v better, complain in the _newspapers that criminal.s are being
coddled by the very Constitution the pro ecutors are ·worn co u phold.
Tt a,bout time for the legal profession to realize just what John Donne
meant when he wrote, "Ask not for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee."
To deny due process to any man is to deny it to ourselves, and to our
ch ildren. To give full constitutional rights to Gideon, to Escobedo,
fi ran.da, Malloy and Mapp is to give them the rights we want preserved
for ourselves.
pevack. held that even a lawyer couJd in oke the Fifth; a nd Gau Lt
held that a child bould not be imprisoned more ca ·ually than a man.
There, are .n o econd class citizens left - except; perhaps our m en in
military ernce who are drafted away from h ome. fami ly work and
o~en due proeess. 'For all" includes oldie.rs sailors, marines and airmen, too.
The words .are not really; "with liberty and justice for alJ be seated."'
The words are "with liberty and justice for ALL.' After lhose words.
cve_ryo.ne in the class - and the country - sho uld be told to Stand. up
a nd be eounted."
Reprinted from Trial, publication of the American Trial Lawyers Association

William Mitchell Opinion
Editor

Dan Byrne

Staff:
J!:)seph Daly, D onald Day, C raig Gagnon, Juliu Gemes William
Glew.. Willi~ Hay R obert Hillstrnm, James Lethert, Bruce emer.
Thomas O M eara, G ary P alm , ffugh Plunkett James P rochnow Wil~
liamJfoed and John Zi mmecman.
'
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an unparalleled opportunity to see
the court in action.

BY DOUGLAS HEIDENREICH

A study of the catalogs of various law schools throughout the
country will quickly confirm the
fact that William Mitchell's Moot
Court program is unique.
It is unusual to devote a total of
four classroom hours each semester
to the Moot Court program. Furthermore, it is unusual to require
the amount of trial work called for
by William Mitch ell 's program.
Each taden t in the program p articipates in two mock trjal which
are as close to the real thing as it
is pos ible to get and to prepare
briefs for a nd to argue one appeal .
T he truly unique thi ng about
the program is the participation in
the program by lawyers and judges
from the Supreme Court level on
down. Each year 20 or more lawyers and judges participate in the
program by lecturing to students in
the course and serving as trial or
appellate judges. These people are
without exception well versed and
thoroughly experienced in the field
of trial work.
It is particularly gratifying to be
able to call upon men who are acknO\ ledged national experts in
trial work. M ost of the lawyers
ho lecture ro the M oot Court program are members of the American Trial Lawyers Association;
several are fellows of the American
College of Trial Lawyers or the
International Academy of Trial
Lawyers. The array of talent which
is displayed for our students in this
program could not be bough1 at
any priee; yet these men genero u ]y
consent to give of their time ye&r
after year witho ut payment.

Many young lawyers who have
been out of school for only a year
or two may find themselves arguing
cases before the Supreme Court.
This brief exposure to the court
during law school stands them in
good stead. Any trial lawyer would
quickly seize the opportunity to
have judges of our Supreme Court
discuss and criticize his work but
seldom does the opportunity present itself. Our students all have
this chance before they complete
their Jaw school careers.

Dean Heidenreich

The highlight of the year in the
Moot Court program is the appearance by four selected students before the Supreme Court of the State
of Minn ota. T he four p articip-ants
who h ave been selected by their
cla. smates prepare briefs and arguments based on a set of facts prepared by Judge Hachey and Mr.
Gislason.
The case usually involves points
of law which have not been settled
in Minnesota and a great deal of
r e earch goes into the preparation
of i.hi material . atura!Jy the students who are able to argu e the
case before the court gain the most
advantage from it; however the
other members of the class who
attend the oral argument and listen
to the discussion and criticism delivered afterwards by some of the
members of the bench also receive

Dean Meets With SBA,
Students on Policy
(Continued From Page 1)

course material and then skip
hastily over other areas.
"If you are assigned to read 50
pages a week and don't and you
haven't read them when the prof~ssor jumps ahead, you haven't
hved up . to y~ur re~ponsibilities,"
Dean He1denre1ch said.
. "The function of the law school
1s to teach the student how to read
the law and figure it out for himself. Someone who sits there and
asks for someone to feed it to him
shouldn't be here."
The dean said professors frequently concentrate on various
areas in a course by design.

"Class discussion is not essential
to learning the material," he said.
FACULTY EVALUATION. It
has been suggested that students
grade each professor after comp!eting a course, with the results of the
grading given exclusively to the individual professor for his guidance.
"I'm not interested in popularity
contests," Dean Heidenreich said.
"More often than not, I'm afraid,
the actual result is just the opposite
(of student evaluation) ."
"I don't think there is a relationship between bar exam results and
what you think is the quality of the
instruction."
APPARENT GRADE DELAY.
Students have complained that profess ors take too long in grading
examinations.
"I'm not sure anything can be
done," Heidenreich said. "I exert
as much pressure on the faculty as
I can to get the grad·es in."

He said he was more concerned
about delays on the second semester grades than on the first semester
grades "because those who are not
coming back should know as soon
as possible."
CLASS RANKING. It was sug-

gested that both the class ranking
system and the grading y tem be
aboli hed. Boch. tend to pr essure
srudents t o wor k toward a hiob
score rather than toward Jea~g
the law it was su e:gested .
"Class ranking is of some value
to the students," Heidenreich said.
"Employers ask for them."
"I don't agrtt with getting rid
of grades. The wading process is
at best an educated guess. But when
education people study these things

they find a 'remarkable correlation
between scholarship and grades."

THIRD YEAR EXAM SCHEDULE. Three weeks are provided
fo;r examinations this year. The
third-year exams are bunched at
the end of the period- Friday,
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.
"The schedule for this year won't
be changed," Heidenreich said. "I
tried to spread them out over the
three-week period, consistent with
all other considerations. I don't
think I'll do it this way next year."
COMMENCEMENT. The commencement exerci'ses will be on a
Monday night, while students suggested that families would be better
able to attend during a weekend.
Speakers prefer a Monday or
Friday, Heidenreich said. He also
said a change would be considered
next year.

Plunkett to Address
Annual Senior Party
Hugh V. Plunkett, Jr., senior
partner in the Austin, Minn., law
firm of Plunkett and Plunkett and
the father of graduating senior
Hugh V. Plunkett III, will address
the graduating seniors and their
wives at the annual senior party to
be held in the school on Friday,
June 7.

It is program of this type to
which WllHam Mitchell poiots with
pr ide. Of cour e we always strive
for perfeetion jn the tradition-al
academic areas. We constantly _eek
to jmprove the quality and technique of our clas room instl'Uction.
We have through expansion and
adjustment of the curriculum
sought to enrich the program available to the William Mitchell students.
However it is in courses such as
the Moot Court program that we
can offer him something truly unusual. Practicing lawyers take valuable days away from their practice
and spend substantial amounts of
money to attend the programs in
which they listen to discussions and
watch demonstrations presented by
the same experts who provide this
valuable training to our students as
part of their academic work. It is
only after a student leaves school
that he discovers how important
and how helpful this opportunity
can be.

Law Wives In
Fund Drive

William Mitchell Law Wives
concluded a year of activities earlier this month and immediately
launched plans for the coming
year's fund-raising project.
Mrs. Julius Gemes was elected
president for the 1968-69 school
year at a potl uck supper May 1.
Retiring president is Mrs. Gerald
Regnier.
Other new officers are Mrs. Daniel Byrne, vice president and program chainnan; Mrs. J. Lance
Jacobson, corresponding secretary·
Mrs. Robert A.hi, recording secrct.ary· Mr ·. George Olds, treasurer;
Mrs. Gerald !\1cManu hospitality
chairman; Mn;. Robert Christianson, publicity chainnan; and Mrs.
Earl Gray, social chairman.

Continuing until December as
board members at large are Mrs.
Ben Brunsvold,
Mrs.
Robert
Hoene, Mrs. Bruce Leier and Mrs.
Clinton McLagan.
Mrs. Gemes has announced that
members of the Law Wives group
will work at Target stores in
Bloomington and Har Mar Mall
on the evening of Sunday, June 23.
Profits from this evening of inventory work will go to the cholarship
fund of William Mitchell College
of Law. All w ives of Wi-Uiam
Mitchell students are asked to contribute their time on Tm-ge t-Scholar hip Day. Chairmen of this project are Mrs. Robert H eotge and
Mrs. :Brunsvold_
Law Wives will provide four
$200 scliolarsbi.ps for the 1968·69
school year, one for a second, third
and fourth year student and one to
go to a minority student. Money
for these cbo]arsh.ips was acquired
from the sale of two sets of original
prints during the year and the
group's annual dance and style
show.
On Friday, June 7, third year
law wives will hostess a buffet for
the graduating senior students and
their families. Mrs. John Owen is
chairman of this annual event.

May, 1968
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Role of Non-Obviousness in Patent Law
By BRUCE A. NEMER

rically opposed arguments as to the meaning
and purposes of Section 103 divided Patent
Law practitioners. Congress intended Section
103 to sweep away judicial precedents and
lower the level of patentability, argued one
group of practitioners. The other group responded: Congress intended Section 103 to
codify the essential purposes of judicial precedents and reject insignificant variations and
innovations as unpatentable.

"Unless more ingenuity and skill . . .
were required than were possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of
skill and ingenuity which constitute essential
elements of every invention. In other words,
the improvement is the work of a skilled
mechanic, not that of the inventor." At
p. 267.
The United States Supreme Court ruled:
the first sentence of Section 103 added the
test of non-obviousness to the previously
existing patentability tests of novelty and
utility; and Congress intended Section 103 to
codify the essential purposes of judicial
precedents including Hotchkiss. 8 Advances
in the art of an ordinary nature are not
patentable.
The Court also set out a procedure for
applying the non-obviousness test of patentability. 9 The steps are:
(1) determine the scope and content of
the pertinent prior art;
(2) determine the differences between the
pertinent prior art and the subject matter
sought to be patented;
(3) determine the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art; and
(4) determine if the differences between
the prior art and subject matter sought to be
patented would have been non-obvious to
one having ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
These questions are to be applied to conditions existing at the time the invention was
made.
The intent of Congress was to direct the

The intent of Congress in codifying the
second sentence of Section 103 quoted above
reinforced the argument for a construction
sweeping away judicial precedents and lowering the level of patentability. The second
sentence abolished the oppressive "flash of
genius" test formulated in Cuno Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp. and admittedly
lowered the level of patentability. 5 The argument was: Because of the purpose of this
sentence of Section 103, Congress must have
intended both sentences of Section 103 to
sweep away judicial precedents and lower
the level of patentability.
The Reviser's Note to Section 103 6 supported the contrary argument that Congress
intended a construction adopting the essential purposes of judicial precedents and
rejecting insignificant variations as unpatentable. That note strongly implies an adoption
of the basic philosophy expressed in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood 7 where the Court stated
the test as:

For the basis of the new patentability test
of non-obviousness, the Court directly interpreted Section 103 in the light of the source
of all federal patent power - the United
States Constitution, Article I Section 8, reading in part:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . To
Promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
Discoveries."
The Court views this clause as both a
grant of power and a limitation. It is a grant
in authorizing the limited monopoly of a
patent, and it is a limitation in the manner
the power may be exercised.

1 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S.
1, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966). Calmar,
Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co. was consolidated with Graham. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 15 L. Ed.
2d 572, 148 U.S.P.Q. 479 (1966) was decided with
Graham upon the same basis. A separate opinion for
Adams was necessitated by subsidiary issues in that case
which were disposed of before the case was treated on
its merits.
"The Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 798, Title 35, codified various scattered patent laws and some judicial precedents for the first time. Section 103 was new.
"The Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318, reads in
part:
. . . that when any person or persons, being a citizen
or citizens of the United States, shall allege that he
or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . .
Letters Patent . . . delivered to the patentee or his
order. ( emphasis added)
Novelty and utility are still tests under the 1952 Patent
Act. 35 U.S.C. Section 101 entitled "Inventions Patentable" reads in part:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, or manufacture, or composition of
matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . (emphasis added)
'The Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 798, 35 U.S.C. 103.
5 314 U.S. 84, 91; 51 U.S.P.Q. 272, 275 (1941) where
the court said:
The new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, and not merely the
skill of the calling,
This test demanded an instantaneous creative "spark"
or "flash" and had consistently been used to void patents
where the invention was made by a carefully planned
and organized research program.
o That note reads:
There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence explicitly in the present statutes, but the refusal
of patents by the Patent Office, and the holding of
patents invalid by the courts, on the ground of lack
of invention or lack of patentable novelty has been
followed since at least as early as 1850. This paragraph is added with the view that an explicit statement in the statute may have some stabilizing effect,

The United States Supreme Court added
a new dimension to the Patent Law in 1966
in the case of Graham v. John Deere.I That
case offered the Court an opportunity to first
construe Section 103 of the Patent Law and
to determine the meaning of the word
obvious within it. 2 The construction made by
the Court added a new patentability test of
non-obviousness to the previously existing
patentability tests of novelty and utility the sole statutory tests since the Patent Act
of 1793. 3
Section 103 reads, in part:
"Condition for patentability; non-obvious
subject matter.
"A patent may not be obtained . . . if
the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made." 4
Prior to Graham, two main and diamet-

focus of the inquiry away from the previously
used subjective test, Is an invention present?
and to the more objective test, Is the subject
matter sought to be patented non-obvious in
view of the prior art? By this change, Congress intended to enhance the certainty of
the patentability investigation basically stated
in Hotchkiss and give it a new practicality.

"The Congress in the exercise of the
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose." 10
The constitutional restraint on the federal
patent power which forms the basis for the
non-obviousness test is found in an expansion
of the word promote within Article I Section 8. 11 In the words of the Court:
"The patent monopoly was not designed to
secure to the inventor his natural right in his
discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.12
. . . The inlierent problem was to develop
some means of weeding out those inventions
which would not be disclosed or devised but
for the inducement of a patent.13" (emphasis
added)

If no inducement is necessary to bring
forth new knowledge, patent protection is
not necessary to promote the useful arts.
Under the constitutional restraints, uniess
patent protection is necessary to promote the
useful arts, no patent may be granted.
Obvious subject matter - that within the
ability of one having ordinary skill in the
art 14 closest to the subject matter sought to
be patented - does not need the inducement
of a patent. Obvious subject matter would
be disclosed naturally, without the inducement of a patent, when a practitioner of the
art has a need or use for it. It would be disclosed naturally since, by definition, it is
generally within the ability of common
practitioners of the art.
Thus, even though the knowledge is new
in the sense of not being previously publicly
disclosed, if it is within the ordinary skill
of common practitioners in the art, it does
not fall within the area set out by the constitutional restraints on the federal patent
power. It should be "weeded out." 15 To merit
a patent, it must be non-obvious in addition
to being new. The reward of a patent is given
only for a public disclosure which promotes
the useful arts, and a public disclosure
which is already within the ordinary skill of
common practitioners in the art does not
promote the useful arts.
After construfag Section 103 to add a new
test of non-obviousness and presenting a fourstep procedure for applying the test, the Court
went on to three examples of its use. The
test was applied to determine the validity of
the three patents in the three cases before
it.16

Included m the discussions were
grades, testing procedures and writing techniques, test scheduling, conflicts in scheduling make-up classes
and participation of students on
faculty committees. These and
other matters will be discussed next
school year.
One concrete result has been
reached. At the suggestion of the
students, faculty members now are
posting the range of grades for
courses so the student can deter-

In discussing the grading system,
students said the marks were
grouped too closely in the C range
of 71-79 and nearly the entire student body falls in that range. Faculty members replied that grades
are relative to each other and the
significant factor in school transfer
or job seeking is the class rank.
Faculty members also indicated,
however, the subject will be discussed at a faculty committee and
some consideration might be given
to lowering the B grade down into
the high 70s.
Donald Day, second year, stu-

The Court emphasized the unexpected results of the patented combination of parts.
It also emphasized the deterrent effect the
prior art teachings would have on a possible
inventor. A possible inventor would have to
experiment in the face of teachings negating
his final result. He would have to overcome
prior art teachings to reach his result. The
subject matter of the battery patent was held
non-obvious over the pertinent prior art; the
validity of the patent was upheld. 2 3
CONCLUSION

Two of the patents, to an improved plow
and for a shipping cap to a sprayer dispenser, were considered together. 17 In both
cases prior art was determined, and the
differences between the prior art and the
patents were noted. In both cases the prior
and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a
later time of some criteria which may be worked out.
The second sentence states that patentability as to
this requirement is not to be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made, that is, it is immaterial whether it resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius. House Comm.
on the Judiciary, Revision of Title 35, United States
Code, H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1952).
7 11 How. 248; 52 U.S. 248 (18501 .
'383 U.S. at 17; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 466.
"383 U.S. at 17; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 467.
10 383 U.S. at 5; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 462.
11
The other two patentability tests - utility and novelty - are also derived from words in Article I Section
8 of th ~ Uni1e_il. States Constitution. The test of utility
derives from the word useful. The test of novelty derives
from D iscoveries.
"'383 U.S. at 9: 148 U.S.P.Q. at 463.
"' 383 U.S. at 11; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 464.
H The words "ordinary ski11 in
the art" appear in

Section 103. These are words of art in Patent Law and
are used in much the same way the reasonable and
prudent man is used in Tort Law.
1a Supra, Note 13.
10 Patent number 2,627,798 was issued to William T.
Graham in 1953 for an improved chisel plow; patent
number 2,870,943 was issued to Baxter I. Scoggin, Jr.
and his assignee, Cook Chemical, in 1959 for a shipping
cap to a sprayer dispenser ( drawings of both of these
potents awenr in the case st.3.rting 38 3 U.S. at 38. 148
U.S,P. Q. ·at 4:7 S); and pciterit .nomber 2,332,2]{) .wi)s issued 10 Bert N . Adams in ,1943 for an imprm•ed. battery.
" Number 2,627,798 issued to Graham and number
2,870,943 issued to Scoggin, Jr.
1s 383 U.S. at 26, 37; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 470, 474.
'"383 U.S. at 36; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 474.
"° Letter to Isaac McPherson, VI Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, (Washington ed.) at 181 (1814).
"'383 U.S. at 19; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 467.
2 2 Number 2,332,210 issued to Adams.
""383 U.S. at 52; 148 U.S.P.Q. at 483.

Liaison Committee Probes Complaints
mine how well he scored in relationship with the enti.re class.

Next, a patent for a new battery came
under the Court's scrutiny.22 While the battery was composed of parts individually
taught by the prior art, no prior art found
taught the particular combination of parts
patented. No prior art found explained the
battery action of the particular combination
of parts patented either. In fact, teachings of
the prior art negated the possibility that the
patented combination of parts would function
as a battery.

The Supreme Court of the United States
has added non-obviousness to novelty and
utility as tests of patentability. The court
reasons from Article I Section 8 of the
United States Constitution which grants
authority to create a patent system "to promote the progress of . . . useful arts . . ."
that obvious subject matter does not promote
the progress of the useful arts. Therefore,
subject matter must be non-obvious to be
patentable.

Venture Called 'Encoura{?infl

The newly formed Student-Faculty Liaison Committee reviewed
several areas of student concern
during a series of meetings this
semester.

art was close; the patents attempted to cover
small improvements to existing structure.
The Supreme Court determined that the subject matter of both patents was obvious
under Section 103. Both patents were held
invalid. 18
In the case of the plow patent, the inventor
knew of the prior art. In the case of the
dispenser cap patent, however, the inventor
did not know of the existence of the prior
art. The Court charged both inventors with
knowledge of the prior art and admonished
them to begin a well-organized research
program by searching patent files.19
The result reached by the Court in applying the new test expresses a policy decision
to disfavor small improvements as not falling
within the "patent umbrella" and not being
"worth to the public the embarrassment of
an exclusive patent," as Thomas Jefferson
stated it. 2 0 The Court said:
" . . . we conclude here that the inquiry
which the Patent Office and the Courts must
make as to patentability must be beamed
with greater intensity on the requirements of
[Section] 103 . . . " 21

dent chairman who presides over
the informal meetings, said the
committee examined the suggestions proposed in an editorial in the
January, 1968, issue of the Opinion.
"There is general agreement that
students should not remain an untapped source," Day said. "Under
consideration is a proposal to have
students sit on faculty committees
to give student views on such matters as admissions, curriculum,
testing, grades, and appeals of dismissals," Day said.

'To date, the venture has been
encouraging," Day said. "With the
committee's embryonic stage past,
it is expected that next year it will
mature fully into a useful instrument promoting better studentfaculty communications and harmony."

ALUMNI BRIEFS
1930

has
joined with Jerome T. Anderson
and Norman Perl in the formation
of DeParcq, Anderson & Perl. The
partnership is located in the Northstar Center, Minneapolis.
WILLIAM

H.

DEPARCQ

1959
BRUCE A. POULSEN has been

named an associate counsel in the
law department of Prudential Insurance Co., Minneapolis.
1963
JAMES L. WALSH has

1953
CLAYTON E. NARVESON has
ioined Weis and Frauenshuh in the
general practice of law at Paynesville, Minn.

1957
RICHARD I. ROSE has been
named senior vice president of
Midland National Bank, Minneapolis.
VERNON E. BERGSTROM has
been appointed by the Idaho Supreme Court to be the court's administrative assistant.

joined
Oppenheimer, Hodgson, Brown,
Wolff and Leach, First National
Bank Building, St. Paul.
1964
NEIL P. CONVERY, former as-

sistant United States district attorney, has joint Smith, Blomquest,
Wilson & Vitko, First National
Bank Building, St. Paul.
1966

has joined
with James Martin in the formation
of Martin and Nelson at Morris,
Minn.
DEWEY

NELSON
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Evidence of Other Crimes in Criminal Trials
fairness which results to an innocent de- likely that the offenses were committed by the
fendant who is confronted with charges same person. That is, that the offender has a
Generally in Minnesota,1 as elsewhere in against which he is not prepared to defend, propensity to commit such offenses.
the United States, "upon the trial of a crimi- which are inflammatory in the extreme, and
In Spreigl the court recognizes how far it
nal case, evidence of the commission of which emanate from witnesses who are manihad gone in redefining the common-schemeother lndependent and unrelated crimes by festly susceptible to influence and suggesor-plan concept.H But it also recognizes that
the defendant is inadmissible to show either tion." s
a propensity to sin may very well be relevant
in a trial for like sins. ". . . [A] basic asguilt or that the defendant would be Likely
What about Spreigl caused the Supreme
sumption implicit in decisions which permit a
to commit the crimes with which he is Court to require the state to begin giving
showing of prior sex offenses is that sex
charged." 2
notice of its intention to use evidence of
offenders have ao established proclivity for
The exclusionary rule is applied subject to other crimes in subsequent criminal trials?
recidivism." 15 Yet to admit evidence of other
widely recognized exceptions. 3 Evidence of The court indicates that "threaded through
offenses which are separate and independent
other offenses is admissible in Minnesota to our precedents dealing with the exceptions
from that charged, however relevant, is to
establish motive, intent, absence of mistake to the exclusionary rule is a note of concern,
render more possible the principal evil against
or accident, identity of the defendant, or a admonishing courts against depriving innowhich the exclusionary rule is aimed - that
the jury may find guilt oo the basis of the
common scheme or plan. 4 The exceptions cent persons of their right to a fair trial." 9
other offenses.16 The possibility that the deare liberally interpreted where sex offenses This constitutional concern is meant to prefendant will be convicted of ao offense other
are involved. 5
vent the defendant from being deprived of a
than that charged is at least reduced when the
While expanding gently the scope of the fair trial by being deprived of notice of the
defendant is made aware that the state inexception which allows proof of other charges against which he must defend. 1 0
tends to use the other offenses in evidence
offenses as part of a common scheme or
against him.
Spreigl presented the court with the opplan,6 the Minnesota Supreme Court in portunity of reevaluating its prior decisions
By the very breadth of the notice requireState v. Spreigl nevertheless announced a regarding the admissibility of evidence of ment 11 the court seems to be giving tacit
singular procedural safeguard to help assure other offenses as part of a common scheme recognition to the patent unfairness of ever
the defendant a fair trial. Henceforth in or plan. Until 1955 whenever evidence of receiving evidence of uncharged offenses if
Minnesota criminal cases the state must give other crimes was sought to be justified as the uncharged offenses are not so related to
the defendant written notice of any other part of a common scheme or plan, it was the offense charged as to be part of it.
offenses which the state will seek to prove required that "[s]ome connection between
Is the exclusionary rule merely a rule of
under the exceptions to the exclusionary the crimes must be shown to have existed in evidence? 1 s Or, is there good reason for the
rule. 7
fact and in the mind of the defendant, unit- Minnesota court to concern itself with the
In 1962 Theodore Spreigl was tried for ing them for the accomplishment of a com- possibility of an infringement of the deand found guilty of taking indecent liberties mon purpose, before such evidence can be fendant's constitutional rights when proof of
with his 11 year old stepdaughter, Sandra, received." 11 In other words, it had to be separate and independent uncharged offenses
in what amounted to an unaccomplished act shown that the offenses were not separate is offered into evidence as part of the prosecution; and good reason for imposing the
of sexual intercourse. Sandra was allowed to and independent.
testify as to other sexual offenses committed
If the offenses are connected in fact and requirement of pretrial notice?
"It is a fundamental principle of proceupon her during the course of the previous in the defendant's mind, the defendant can
year. The defendant was not charged with reasonably expect to be confronted with both dural due process that one cannot be conthese latter offenses. Two other stepchildren, offenses and can reasonably be expected to victed of a crime of which he is not aca boy and girl, both IO years of age, were prepare to defend against both. Before 1955 cussed . . ." 19 This proposition does not, of
allowed to testify as to numerous sexual no formal notice that the state would intro- course, apply to conviction of a lesser ofmolestations by the defendant occurring over duce evidence of other offenses as part of a fense, the elements of which are included
an indefinite period of time, but all occurring common scheme or plan was necessary to within the elements of the more serious
at least a month before the offense charged. protect the defendant from having to defend offense with which the defendant is charged.
If conviction under a defective indictment
Two of the tliree children made no comagainst the proof of other offenses. If the
is a violation of procedural due process beplaint about the defendant's alleged conduct
offenses were not so connected that he could
cause the defendant is not adequately "in·
uotil after the offense for which the defendant
safely be assumed to have notice, the eviformed of the nature and cause of the accusa·
was charged. The third never complained.
dence was inadmissible. However, in 1955 in
tion," 20, how can there be any less a violation
The defendant did not appear as a witness on
State v. D ePauw, 12 the Supreme Court reof procedural due process when a jury is per·
his own behalf. The failure of the trial court
defined the common-scheme-or-plan concept
mitted to convict the defendant of uncharged
to exclude the testimony of the three children
offenses which the defendant has no reason to
to include other offeo e which are of a
as to prior offenses was assigned as error. The
believe will be offered into evidence against
common
pattern
with
the
offense
charged.rn
Supreme Court ruled that receiving such teshim? There cannot. To conclude otherwise
Somehow the court felt that evidence of a
timony without giving the defendant prior
would be to require the defendant always to
notice of the state's intention to use it was
common pattern of offenses is not the same
prepare to defend against every bad act it
error. A new trial was ordered. The decision
as evidence of a propensity to commit such
is possible to accuse him of. He must be prehinged upon
offenses. One wonders how the court escaped
pared to defend his life history, and perhaps
" .. . whether the unquestioned relevance the recognition that to show a pattern comeven his character.21
of testimony that a defendant has committed mon to several offenses without showing a
Each time evidence of separate and indeother sex offenses, if true, gives it sufficient connection in fact or in the mind of the pendent uncharged offenses is received at
probative value to outweigh the patent un- offender is to show circumstantially that it is trial, it is possible that the jury will convict
By

WILLIAM
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HAY

t tb.U: , ,. Spreigl, 272
Linn. 48 • 490. 139 N .W.2d
167, 1.69, (l 965).
"J >\'harfon, Criminal Lnw ~ US, nt. 492-94- ( 121h ed.
19S5 ).
• / ti. ~ 233, ;:i:t 49S-99.
" Tt:i<> rule prohibiting cvidehce of the commission of
other crimes ·is subject to twe major exceptions, (1)
Proof of the commission of another crime 1l p roper
whenever a. statute provjdes for the enhancc.ment of.
lilt defendant's punishment i( he is n former offender . . • (2 ) Proof of an !ndeyendent crime is
a.dmj~~ible if it is re.lcvant to the proof of the g uilt
of, lhe defendant for the crime with wbkh. he is
chac.ged .''
·
• 272 finn. a t '191, 1.39 .w:2d at 169.
~ tate v. weeney, 180 ,\II.inn. -160. 455, 2'~1
.W. 225
.1.27 ( 19:lO) •
• l Jnfil pccigl v. State the court had not held that
t v:idcnce of offenses mcn:.ly simhar in n.ature, not
tdenti'<,i!, committed upon seJ)1ln1.te victim · is ndmisslb!c.
!{ere the court ruled that such evidence should be admjl1l,d at the new- trial.
• 272 ~ n- a.t 496. 139 . W.2d at 173.
·' . . . rWJherc the state seeks to prove that an accused
has been 11!1ilty of additional crime.~ and miscon duct
on other QCC.t.Sion~. all.bou~ such -evidcnc~ ·fs. otherwise admissible · under some C!l<ception to the general
e,ccl11sfonary · rule. it shall not hl>reaftcr be recelvcd
unle),S. within a reasonn.b le time befo,c [rfuJ the state:
furnishes defcmfanf in writing _ a sfruement of the
ofit:nSes it i,ntends ro sbow he has committed. de-

SCTibed with the partlculnrily required or :m indictment or i:nfommtiiln. subject to @ :- following exci,ptions : (a) Offenses wll ich are p:!rt of the immedi aleepi ode for which the defendant is being tried ; ( b)
offenses for which defenda-nt has previOu"1y been
prQsecuted: and ( c) offenses wl1ioh are introduced
to rebut. defcend:lnt's evidence of good ohnractcr."
' I d. at 490. 139 N .W.2d - ,n 169.
h Id. at 49S. 139
.W .ld at .171.
10
State v. Austin, 74 Minn. 463, 464, 77 N.W. 301 ,
302, (1 898) .
·To a,dmit _evidence of another criminal :ict would be
to oppress a defendru,t_ by try{ng him !or an oficn.~e
of w.bich he has no notice, and [or ..,hteh he .is unprepared, and, freq urntly, to prejudice him in the
eyes of the jury. n
Sta te v. Fitcbem,. ij8 Mlnn. 145_; 147, 92 N .W. S27,

S28

(19{}2).

'"He ls illso ~titled to bee inf-0rm..-<l of lhe precise
charge he is to meet, that he mny prepare fo r trlal.
These rig.hts are secured by constiturio ual sanctions
and sho.uJd be efficiently guarded by the courts."
" 180 1'ji nn. at 4.55, 231 N.W. at 221.
~246 Minn. 91. 74.N.W.2d 297 (1.955).
•• Id. a t 95, 74
. W .2d_ at 300.
' '\Vhile a ·col)l1l)On scheme or plan' is not too -well
ddln ed, ft would nevertheless s.eem that, whe re we
have a commo n pattern as disclo$cd by the eYidence
here, it would hardly do violence to the ·exccplio·n to
th e geheral rnle to recoJ1Di~e th at I.be defenda nt bad a
purpose of a busing smaU childrta in his neighborhood

while th ey were in his house." (emphasis supplied )
H 272 Minn. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 171.
"In permitting evidence of other offenses to be r eceived as a part of a common plan or scheme. we
have come perilously close to p utting the deftndant's
allarncter :md r<cord in issue notwithstanding his
failure to tnke the wttnei· · stand •• . "
1; Id. at 493, 139 N .W.2d at 170.
in See 1 Wigmore. Evidence § 194. at 650 (3d ed.
1940).
I'i Supra , note 7.

•• B altimore Rai11o Show. Inc. v. tute. 193 Md. 300,
67 A.2d -197 ( 1949) ; cert. dtmied M:uylru!d v. Baltimore
Rndio Sbow. Inc .. 33
.S. 912 (1950). Here trial court
,~sued crimfnal contempt cilations 10 thrci: radio broad•
cast conipa nies, holding that their sensationalized coverage of a ch ild s laying dq,rived the acc)Jsed killer of a ny
ch:mce for a fafr trial Oo appeal lhl: M3cy.Iand SupTem.e
Court .reversed. h olding that (among o ther lhings) even
if evidence of the accused killer's prior crimes was
brought to the jury by tlie sensational pretrial publicity,
the constitutional rights of the accused were not violated
beca use
" [w]ithout questioning the soundness of the rule of
exclusion prior to verdictl it r emains a rule of evi-

dence. noL a corrstltutionaJ rii;,ht."
Had certiorari 110! been ·denied, it is probable that the
uprcme Court would nor have de,ided the particular
issue we nre concerned with hero. I t lacked the rcqui.\rtc
:~ripeness.,.
1.1)

-

Scott, A Fair Trial for the Accused: Fairness in

of the uncharged offenses. But, as the court
points out in Spreigl, proof of the uncharged
offenses may be relevant to proof of the
offenses charged. 2 2 The principles of fairness
and justice which demand the defendant
have notice of the offenses that will be
proved against him 2 3 do not require the
state forgo the use of relevant evidence
merely because it consists of proof of
separate and unrelated offenses.
The United States Supreme Court has yet
to decide whether in a criminal prosecution
the state is precluded constitutionally from
offering in evidence proof of separate and
independent uncharged offenses. There is
dictum in Michigan v. United States which
indicates such evidence is inadmissible even
though it be relevant to proof of guilt of the
offense charged. 24 If the question is ever put
squarely before it, the United States Supreme
Court might decide, as the Supreme Court
of Oregon decided in 1914, that the infringement of constitutional rights "might be
palliated if there was any provision for
giving the defendant notice of the other
charges . . . . " 25
There is some indication of the direction
in which the Minnesota court is moving in
its most recent decision regarding the admissibility of evidence of separate and
independent uncharged offenses, State v.
Billstrom. 2 6 Here the court clarifies the
notice requirement by adding that : (a) In its
written notice the state must specify which
exception to the general. exclusionary rule it
will rely on; (b) though the evidence need
not prove the other offense beyond reasonable doubt, proof of them must be clear and
convincing; (c) evidence of other offenses
which is 'merely cumulative and a ubteriuge
for impugning the defendant's character'' is
inadmissible; and (d) the trial court must
instruct the jury in unequivocal terms that a
conviction may not be based upon any
offense but that charged.
Reading the Spreigl aod Billstrom decisions
together. one cannot hclp feeling that the
Miones<>ta court is mov~ toward a future
decision which will hold that evidence of any
other· offenses that is relevant to proof of the
offense charged is admissible if the defendant
has notice of the state's intention to offer
such evidence and if it is not mereJy cumulative and a subteduge for impu.,.oni:o the
defendant' character". This will be fale even
though the evidence falls wholly outside the
traditional exceptions to the exclnsionarf
rule. The court seems to be preparJng for
constitutional obje:ctions which will b e .raisea
if the state is allowed to put in evid(! oce proof
of any other offenses which are rele.\'aJJt to
proof of the offense charged.
Accusar/011 of Crime, 41. Minnesota L3w R.-•iew 509. 5 19
( 1957 J. Professor Seen, in sp~"1king of the permissible

bceadth of a crimina l indictment. is echoing the. oiled
tales Sllpre,;ne Court which Jiad said.
" Conviction upOn. ~ ~ha rge nqt made would ·be a sheer
dMia.l of. due process."
Dc,Jong_e v. Oregon , 299 U .S. 353. 362 (1937).
1 U .S. Const. amend. VT.
<'1 Supra, note 14.
20 272 Minn. 488, 139 N .W .2d 167 passim . See especially the quoted p assages from 1 Wigmore, Evidence
(3d ed. 1940) .
""1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 205, at 447 (5th
ed. 1956). Defendant
". . . can with f a irness be expected to come into court
prepared to meet accusations contained in the indictment only, a nd, on ibis accoun t. all the evidence offen,d by the p rosecution shi,.ald ~oasi~t wholly of facts
wlricb are within the ra nge and scope of its allegations."
~•335 U.S. 469. ~75 (1 94 ).
" The state may not bow defendant' _ prior trouh1c
wjUt rhe law. sp eclfic erjmiJ:ml acts, or ill na me 4mong
hi neighbor,;, evcen though such facts_ might log.ichlly
be ·p er1it1 asise tb:lt ho is by propen.:;ity ·a probable
pe.rpetrin or of the crime.•·
"" State v. Jensen, 70 O re. 156. 157, 140 P. 740, 741
(191 4). With the Spreigf decisio n Minnesota became the
first state. to require such notice.
"'State v. Billstrom, -Minn.- , 149 N.W.2d 281
(1967) .

Fraternity Membership Grows

PAD Elects Lethe rt Justice
The Pierce Butler chapter of Phi
Alpha Delta law fraternity has
elected new officers and drafted a
program for the 1968-69 school
year.
James Lethert, third year, was
named justice, the top ranking position, and James Johnson, third
year, was named vice justice.
Other officers named are Byron
Zotaley, second year, clerk; Bruce
Eckholm, second year, treasurer;
and Michael McDonough, second
year, marshal!. Alan Larson, secord
year, was elected the fraternity's
representative on the Student-Faculty Liaison Committee.

Nineteen members joined the organization last fall and 11 entered

Lethert

Johnson

this spring, Lethert said. The membership now is about 70.

The chapter will continue month-

ly luncheons with top speakers and
hopes to broaden both its professional and social activities, Lethert
said. Evening dinner meetings with
top speakers are being planned.
The chapter hopes to join with the
Student Bar Association in organizing a placement program which
will help students meet prominent
persons within their field of interest, Lethert said.
The possibility of a spring
dinner-dance and a few stag events
during the year are being examined, Lethert said.
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